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Executive Summary
The 2013 Inter-American War Game (IAWG) was hosted by the U.S. Naval War
College (USNWC). The IAWG is intended to provide an opportunity for professional
exchange of views among maritime war colleges in the Western Hemisphere, ultimately
to enhance multinational cooperation among our maritime forces.
The 2013 IAWG was organized into an on-line planning phase in Feb 2013, an online execution phase in May 2013, and Closing Conference analysis phase in Aug 2013.
IAWG countries include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Invitations were to participate were provided to each IAWG country. Twelve countries
participated in the 2013 IAWG.
2013 IAWG objectives were to: explore considerations for the employment of a
multinational force; explore considerations for organizing an MNF command and control
(C2) structure; and consider varying national policies on the use of force when
organizing MNF forces.
The game was organized into two moves. Country Teams (CTs) were presented
with a scenario of a fictitious failed state Orangeland, hampered by fighting among
trans-criminal organizations, and an Orangeland submarine suspected of having been
seized by TCO members.
CTs presented a variety of responses to the challenges presented in the game. CTs
shared many perspectives on responding to the: missing submarine, cyber threat,
humanitarian problem, and handling detainees. CTs considered changes to rules of
engagement as the scenario unfolded. Some CTs elected to execute multiple,
simultaneous lines of operation, versus sequential phasing, due to the relatively short
90 day multi-national force (MNF) mandate.
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I. Background
The Inter-American War Game (IAWG) is an annually occurring, operational-level, 1sided war game, blending on-line and in-person collaboration, held among up to 14
western hemisphere war colleges. The IAWG, first held in 1972, is an educational and
experiential war game, with a qualitative research analytical component.
IAWG Purpose
The purpose of the IAWG gaming series is to provide opportunities for professional
exchange of views among maritime war colleges, discuss possible doctrinal differences,
and examine unique national perspectives on the employment of naval forces in a
variety of circumstances (e.g., piracy, terrorism, and natural or man-made disasters).
IAWG General Game Objectives
To accomplish the IAWG purpose, several enduring game objectives have been
agreed to by all participating countries. These include a desire to:
1. Increase professional academic exchange, mutual knowledge and integration of
the Naval War Colleges of the Americas.
2. Provide a forum with academic freedom and a non-binding manner, where the
institutions that participate can:
a. Exchange ideas and knowledge,
b. Promote regional strategic cooperation,
c. Improve bases of mutual understanding, planning, analysis and solution of
international crises through the use of coalition and/or combined naval forces,
d. Optimize the level of response to potential threats from the hemisphere,
e. Study cases of common interest at the operational level through the application
of war gaming techniques,
f. Share common planning procedures, such as Navy Warfare Planning
Publication (NWP) NWP 5-01, and,
g. Shared doctrine –NATO publications.
IAWG 2013 Specific Game Objectives
The IAWG 2013 Control Group derived several specific objectives from the enduring
general IAWG objectives. These were:
1. Explore planning considerations for employment of a multinational force (MNF),
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2. Explore command and control organizational options for a MNF, and
3. Explore differing ROE interpretations that may influence MNF employment
options.
IAWG 2013 Modifications
The IAWG has undergone periodic refinements since the initial game in 1972.
Changes to the 2013 IAWG included:
1. Briefing and gaining concurrence from all delegates on the game concept
(specific objectives, design, and scenario) at the IAWG closing conference
preceding the year of game execution,
2. Introducing a virtual planning conference to discuss game milestones and game
products delivery, reducing Country Team (CT) travel expenses,
3. Introducing, testing an new game management platform (Google),
4. Introducing cyber as maritime planning consideration into the IAWG series,
5. Seeking more in-depth move exploration by tailoring to two moves versus three
moves,
6. Introducing an analysis component and game report to coherently document
game findings.
Contact with IAWG 2013 Country Teams
At the 2012 IAWG closing conference held in Colombia, each attending delegation
was presented with details for accessing the 2013 IAWG web site, including CT user
name, CT password, and instructions for accessing and using the IAWG game web site.
For IAWG colleagues unable to attend the 2012 IAWG closing conference in Colombia,
the IAWG 2013 Control Group attempted to contact each delegation/CT individually
through previously established personal contacts, or as a last resort, through the U.S.
embassy in those countries. Our IAWG colleagues in Paraguay corresponded with the
IAWG 2013 Control Group during game preparation, but regrettably were not able to
participate during the execution phase. The IAWG 2013 Control Group was fortunate to
collaborate with IAWG colleagues from Venezuela during the IAWG 2012 in Bogota and
Cartagena, Colombia, but unfortunately have not received responses forwarded by the
U.S. embassy in Caracas. Additionally, our IAWG colleagues from Bolivia kindly shared
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their IAWG 2013 game responses, but were precluded from attending the IAWG closing
conference.
Conclusion
The IAWG series seeks to facilitate an exchange of views among Western
Hemisphere war colleges to promote cooperation, mutual understanding, and enhance
maritime responses to man-made and natural threats. The IAWG 2013 specifically
explored alternative C2 structures, varying operational design approaches, with
consideration of the operational impacts of nation-specific rules on the use of force.
Modifications introduced into the 2013 IAWG included: briefing the design and specific
objectives at the preceding IAWG closing conference; introduction of an on-line
planning conference; introducing cyber threats into the game scenario; and the
introduction of a written game report to record game planning, execution, and analysis.
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II. Literature Review
“(N)ations have a common interest in achieving two complementary objectives: facilitating
maritime commerce that supports economic security, and protecting themselves from hostile,
terrorist, criminal, and other dangerous acts in the maritime environment. Due to the fact that
all nations benefit from collective security, all must share in the responsibility for maintaining
maritime security against the threats that emerge in this domain” (Moeller, et al., 2008, p. 93).

The maritime environment is important to countries throughout the entire world,
including countries in the Western Hemisphere. There are a variety of maritime threats
that challenge maritime nations, such as illicit trafficking by trans-criminal organizations
(TCOs), and more recently threats in the cyber domain from a variety of state and nonstate actors.
Significance of the Maritimes
The maritime environment is important to many countries. Most nation-states border
an ocean, have populations that live near an ocean, and send or receive internationally
traded goods moved across oceans (Martinez, 2008). Increased international trade has
heightened the importance of a secure maritime environment (Del Alamo, 2008). For
example, “…95% of Brazil’s trade moves through the oceans, and 90% of his country’s
oil is produced at sea” (Taylor, 2008). Further, countries that depend on maritime trade
also depend on a secure international maritime trading environment with respect for
international law (Niemann, 2008).
Threats to Western Hemisphere Maritime States
The new threats to hemispheric security assume to a greater extent a transnational and
asymmetric character, and the probable scenario for their evolution demonstrates the
need to act in a cooperative way at the level of the Americas to defend the common interest
(Thornberry, Aguire, & Garcia, 2008, p. 128).

Maritime states confront many challenges, including challenges from the sea. Some
challenges from the sea confronting maritime states include threats posed by
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), drug trafficking, trafficking in persons (TIP),
and cyber threats.
1. Transnational Criminal Organizations. Transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) pose a hemispheric threat through exploitation of “…under-governed areaswhere state capacity is weak and corruption and impunity are rampant-to consolidate
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control over drug, money, weapons, and human smuggling networks that span the
hemisphere” (Kelly, 2013, p.9). Further, TCOs “…have access to key facilitators who
specialize in document forgery, trade-based money laundering, weapons procurement,
and human smuggling, including smuggling of special interest aliens” (Kelly, 2013,
p.11). TCOs use several techniques and modes of transportation.
a. Illicit Trafficking. Illicit trafficking such as drugs, persons, weapons pose
challenges to maritime states.
b. Drugs. Illicit trafficking, such as with drug trafficking, is a challenge (Del Alamo,
2008).
c. Transport means. There are several methods to transport illicit cargo, including
by air or by sea, such as with semi-submersible submarines.
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“An average of 14 planes per year are stolen in Colombia, presumably by drug traffickers
making their way north through Central America, Colombian media reported Tuesday (Fox

News Latino, April 10, 2012).
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Cyber Threats.

“Knowledge of the cyber threat landscape and government responses in Latin
America and the Caribbean is incomplete” (OAS, 2013, p. 1). “The 32 OAS Member
States from Latin America and the Caribbean were invited to voluntarily provide
information on the types and extent of cyber security (OAS, 2013, p. 1). Further,
“…discussions with participating Member States revealed that a lack of effective
communication and information sharing within governments in reporting cyber incidents
remains a key challenge (OAS, 2013, p.3). “In 2012, governments generally noted an
increase in the frequency of cyber incidents compared with 2011, even where definitive
quantitative data was incomplete or unavailable” (OAS, 2013, p.1). “The minimum
assessed increase in cyber incidents over the period 2011 to 2012 reported by a
government was 8–12%, while on the high end, two others reported an increase of 40%
(OAS, 2013, p. 3).
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Need for Cooperation among Maritime States

Collaboration among states facing comparable maritime challenges presents
opportunities for multinational cooperation. Multinational cooperation responds to a
need for “…need for coordinated, cooperative and multinational responses” (Moeller, et
al., 2008). “(I)t is essential to look for points of consensus and to establish the bases
upon which to redefine the current defense system” (Thornberry, Aguirre, and Garcia,
2008, p. 125). Collaboration among hemispheric institutions is a key instrument for
enhancing hemispheric mutual confidence (Thornberry, Aguirre, & Garcia, 2008, p.
125). Reflection on successful and unsuccessful intercultural interactions is a one of
several principles of international education (Crichton & Scarino, 2007).
“The system of hemispheric security must be an instrument of operational
cooperation…(and) redesigned so as to deal with the threats that exceed the
capabilities of individual states or transcend national borders” (Thornberry et al., 2008,
p.125).
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Challenges to Multinational Maritime Cooperation

An absence of common operating and communications procedures hinders multinational cooperation. “The ability to operate with others is a basic condition for
achieving effective cooperation” (Niemann, 2008, p.49). To operate together,
compatible communications systems and processes are required. Integrated
communication among navies may enhance the ability of maritime forces to confront
non-traditional threats (Rogerio, 2008). “The participants are responsible for developing
mutual knowledge and common procedures, reinforcing trust, training the units, and
sharing real-time information, goods, and services, in order to unite efforts so as to meet
common interests” (Niemann, 2008, p. 49). “Common training is a key aspect in
developing interoperability” (Niemann, 2008, p.49). Some specific areas of exploration
to facilitate cooperation among partner navies include:
1. Command and Control (C2). C2 matters are often national-navy specific and
introduce challenges to overcome when operating in a multinational environment
(Texieira Martins, 2008).
2. Interoperability. Mutual interaction through common procedures, training
interaction, and logistics sharing facilitates interoperability (Niemann, 2008).
3. International Law and Rules on the Use of Force. There is a tension between
respected national maritime responsibilities contrasted with international responsibilities
(Balaresque, 2008). Therefore, the 2013 IAWG specific game objectives focused on
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C2, planning and the employment of forces, with consideration of international and
nation-specific rules on the use of force.
Admiral Niemann’s and Captain Rogerio’s views directly relate to the enduring and
2013 IAWG specific objectives. The IAWG provides an opportunity to explore different
perspectives on ways of confront maritime challenges, varying perspectives on
multinational command and control arrangements, varying perspectives on multinational
planning and conduct of multinational operations, and finally varying national
perspectives on international and national policies on the use of force.
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III. IAWG 2013 Game Design & Anlaysis Methodology
Game Design Methodology
The 2013 IAWG was a 1-sided, educational and experiential game, hybrid blend of
on-line and in-person war game, played at the operational level of war. Players from
each of the 14 country team (CT) players were presented with an initial scenario for
Move 1, and scenario updates introduced into Move 2, fully developed only after the
Control Group analyzed player Move 1 responses. The IAWG is an unclassified game,
held for educational purposes and to facilitate mutual understanding and cooperation
among military colleges and ultimately among naval operating forces. Therefore,
players broadly and generally represented specific national policies and capabilities.
International agreements and circumstances for delegation of command were
characterized only to highlight the importance of national distinctions when planning
multi-national operations.
IAWG 2013 Game Organizational Structure
The IAWG game series is aided by an existing organizational structure, briefly
summarized below, understood by all IAWG delegates, contributing to mutual
understanding of game protocols, thereby facilitating focus on the the insights and
distictive features highligted from participant perspectives.
Game Director Group (GDG). This group, also known as the Control Group, was
managed by NWC WGD with the assistance of members of the Colombian Military
College and the Brazilian Naval War College. The GDG is responsible to organize,
execute, and provide a forum for game analysis. Traditionally, the country hosting the
IAWG from the previous year (Colombia in 2012) participates in the management, as
does the country hosting the subsequent year’s game (Brazil in 2014). The GDG
reviewed CT move submissions and derived discussion topics based on CT responses.
Game Director Assistant. Additionally, a new position called the Assistant Game
Director was established based upon a majority vote at the 2012 IAWG Closing
Conference hosted by Colombia. The purpose of the three-year Game Director
Assistant position is to provide continuity among the rotating IAWG hosting countries to
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monitor progress toward attainment of game objectives. A more detailed description of
the Assistant Game Director Duties is included in Appendix B.
Country Team (CTs). Each participating war college organized a team to represent
their respective country the IAWG. During the game CTs were asked to play two roles:
the first role was as the commander of one’s own national forces participating in the
Multi-National Force (MNF), and secondly to serve as commander all MNF forces. CTs
are responsible to analyze the military problem presented in game moves, consider
relevant information presented, and deliver a move response the problem presented.
Game Phases. The game was organized into five phases. These included an
administrative, organizational phase; a planning phase; an execution phase; an analysis
phase; and concluded with a closing conference phase.
1. Administrative, Organizational Phase (Sept 2012-Feb 2013). The 2013
IAWG game hosting team briefed specific game objectives, scenario, and game
processes at the 2012 IAWG Closing Conference in Cartagena, Colombia. 2012 IAWG
Closing Conference concurred with the objectives, design, and scenario presented by
the IAWG 2013 host. Additionally, 2013 IAWG web site access procedures and
passwords were provided to attendees of the 2012 IAWG Closing Conference.
During the pre-planning phase, communications were established among the
Country Team players, and requests for Country Team products, such as order of battle
(OOB), national specific rules on the use of force (ROE) were provided. For those CTs
unable to attend the 2012 IAWG Closing Conference, the US NWC IAWG attempted
communication with the last known email addresses for prior IAWG participants. If that
failed, the letter from the USNWC president inviting game participation was sent to the
US embassy for further delivery to the respective country war college presidents. The
Control Team informally communicated with CTs to help facilitate understanding of the
requested data and format to be discussed at the subsequent on-line Planning Phase.
Prior to the Administrative Organizational Phase, the Control Group gathered,
organized, and identified still-needed materials to prepare for the subsequent planning
phase. Additionally, the USNWC president sent a letter to each of the 13 presidents of
sister naval, military, or joint war colleges inviting 2013 IAWG participation.
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2. Planning Phase (Feb 2013). The planning phase consisted of an on-line chat
session among CTs to review, discuss, the adequacy of game processes, and discuss
game products developed to date. The Control Group clarified procedures that may not
have been previously clearly explained. An additional implied purpose of the Planning
chat session was to ensure the functionality of communication among CTs using chat
procedures through the 2013 IAWG on-line web site.
3. Execution Phase (Apr-May 2013). Game execution began 30 April with the
posting of Move 1. Players were provided three days to prepare and submit responses.
After CT move posting, the Control Group, consisting of representatives from the
Colombian War College and Brazilian Naval War College, and U.S. Naval War College,
worked in teams to review and analyze CT inputs. Control Group analysis teams briefed
one-another on the main points of each CT’s response, and provided an opinion on
noteworthy aspects. After reviewing and briefing all CT inputs, the Control Group
deliberated to identify possible discussion topics. The ten topics identified during the
Control Group analysis discussion were narrowed to three for posting on the IAWG web
site. CTs were then invited to comment on each of the three discussion topics. As
contrasted with other IAWG real-time post-move chat sessions, the 2013 IAWG design
selected asynchronous discussion, versus real-time chat, as the mechanism for
providing feedback, in order to provide CTs ample time for responding in a deliberate,
unhurried manner. Additionally, to foster interaction, CTs were also invited to provide
discussion comments on one another’s chat submissions.
4. Analysis Phase (May-August 2013). At the conclusion of the Execution
Phase, 2013 IAWG Control Team members gathered to conduct a deliberate review of
all CT move submissions for Moves 1 and 2, CT discussion comments, and initial postgame comments and lessons. From that player data, the Control Team sought to
discern themes and implications to be presented at the Closing Conference for
discussion among all delegates.
5. Closing Conference Phase (Aug 2013). The final phase of the 2013 IAWG is
the Closing Conference. At the Closing Conference, senior leaders from each
participating country gather to share and discuss observations on the game. The 2013
IAWG Control Team presents a game overview briefing, complemented with insights
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shared by each Country Team delegation. Additionally, the Assistant Game Director
will deliver a presentation on the IAWG progress toward attainment of game objectives.
Finally, the 2014 IAWG host will present an overview of the subsequent 2014 IAWG
objectives, design, and scenario.
Player Activities. Prior to game execution, CT players were asked to provide
several products, including a CT-specific order of battle of maritime forces for
contribution to the combined force, and a CT-specific ROE, formatted in a spreadsheet
developed per the International Humanitarian Law handbook. Game execution was
separated into two moves. Move 1 asked CT players to analyze tasking from higher
headquarters, develop a plan, and consider the impacts of national ROE on plan
execution. The Control Group reviewed all CT responses and identified discussion
topics that were posted on the game web site for CT to comment, and/or comment on
other CT’s comments. In Move 2, CT players were provided a scenario update and then
asked to consider whether force reorganization or redistribution was warranted, whether
existing ROE was adequate, and if not adequate identify ROE modifications. Similar
the post Move 1 process, the Control Group identified, posted, and solicited feedback
on discussion topics.
IAWG 2013 Game Scenario. The fictitious scenario took place in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean, Caribbean, and Western Atlantic. Most geography was realistic except for the
inclusion of two fictitious island states: Orangeland located in the Eastern Pacific and
Redland located in the Western Atlantic, as depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Operating area presented to players in the 2013 IAWG.

The game was set in 2013 using existing, fielded IAWG-member forces. CT players
were provided a global and regional context, consisting of an improving global
economy, but one with increasing trans-national criminal organizations (TCOs) activity.
The nexus of illicit trafficking criminals and terror-using non-state actor TCOs poses a
Hemispheric threat, as highlighted as a by a senior retired Latin American naval leader
during a recent an USNWC academic lecture. Per the game scenario, TCOs received
support from renegade countries that support and gain economically from these
activities, enabling TCOs to increase in capabilities, intelligence gathering, organization,
improved technology, armament, training, and leadership enabled many TCOs to
surpass the capability of many state’s security forces to interdict or deter their activities.
These combinations have resulted in TCOs settling within state’s borders and enabling
them to operate freely without a threat to their interconnected networks of illegal activity.
The most recent country to be affected by the influence of transnational criminal
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organizations is the county of Orangeland located in the Eastern Pacific off the coast of
Panama and Colombia. Players were presented with two game moves.
Move 1. In the first move, players were asked to consider the scenario, guidance
from higher headquarters, and develop a concept to meet a somewhat ambiguous UN
Security Council resolution. Players were then requested to develop a plan, from the
MNF commander perspective, to employ all MNF assets to accomplish the political
objectives assigned. Players were asked to:
1. create a MNF command and control (C2) structure,
2. develop a concept of force employment to address the challenge presented, and
3. consider varying use of force requirements of individual MNF-members when
organizing the force and developing an employment concept.
Move 2. In the second move, players were provided with a scenario update, further
complicating their original problem. The officially neutral, Caribbean-located, fictitious
country of Redland sent a Surface Action Group on a routine training exercise in the
vicinity of Pacific-located and distressed Orangeland. Further, fighting erupted in
Orangeland among competing TCOs. Additionally, a Sango class Orangelend
submarine ceased routine communications. Subsequently, bodies, later positively
identified as Orangeland submarine crew members, washed ashore in Orangeland.
Later, intelligence reports noted that a Sango submarine was sighted alongside a
suspected TCO mothership, but on a subsequent mothership surveillance mission, the
Sango was not seen alongside. Finally, the Orangeland government reported
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack, disrupting Orangeland ability to
communicate with its citizens, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Orangeland,
and the multinational force sent to assist Orangeland.
Based upon the Move 2 scenario update, CT players were asked assess the current,
including possible modifications. Specifically, CTs were asked to provide:
1. Description of any redistribution or reorganization of MNF forces based upon the
latest scenario update and consideration of nation-specific rules on the use of force, and
2. Identification of requested ROE changes to the Move 1 ROE required to
accomplish the multi-national mission.
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Information Technology. The 2013 IAWG shared information with CTs through a
Google internet-based platform located at: https://sites.google.com/a/usnwc.edu/iawg/).
Game Analysis Methodology
The 2013 IAWG used a descriptive design, with a sequential explanatory strategy.
Game data were inductively analyzed through content analysis to discern themes
(Patton, 2002). CTs were presented with a scenario and provided two to three specific
questions per each of the two game moves related to the C2, planning, and ROE game
objectives. CTs were provided 2-3 days to submit a response. The format of reposnses
were open-ended, without a prescribed format.
After receipt of CT responses, the multinational Control Group comprised of
representatives from the 2012 IAWG game hosts from Colombia, the future 2014 IAWG
game hosts from Brazil, and the current 2013 USA game hosts reviewed CT responses.
The USNWC used the example set by previous game hosts from Mexico, the
Dominican Republic, and Colombia, on how best to organize a Control Group during the
execution phase.
The Control Group during the execution phase was further subdivided into four
analysis sub-teams, each responsible to review to the Move submisions from three to
four CTs. Analysis sub-teams were given several hours to review each of the assigned
CT responses. Analysis sub-teams were then asked to:
1. Summarize each CT’s response,
2. Explain whether the CTs provided a thorough response to the questions posed,
3. Identify similarities, distinctions, and unique aspects of CT inputs.
Each Control Group sub-team briefed responses from their respective group of CT
responses, the Game Director recorded the approximately 20 notewothy aspects on a
white board. These noteworthy aspects were identified as potential discussion topics
for posting on the game web site. The Control Group then deliberated on the various
potential topics and narrowed them to the most significant and essential aspects. After
several hours of analysis and distillation, three or four discussion topics were posted on
the game web site for comment.
Next, discussion topics were shared with all CTs. CTs were then asked for an
individual CT reposnse, in an open-ended on-line format. Move 2 discussion topics
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were also analyzed. Finally, all Move 1, Move 2, Discussion comments from all CTs
were analyzed and hopefully faithfully represented in this 2013 IAWG game report.

24

IV. Game Outcomes
This section will describe player responses to Moves One and Two, and provide
an overview of the post-move discussion portion.
Move 1
In Move 1, players were asked to perform several tasks. Players were first asked to
evaluate an operational problem, formulate a multi-national command and control
structure, and develop an operational plan for the employment of the multinational force designed, and finally consider varying nation-specific limits on the use of
force.
1. Command & Control. Most (7) CTs organized their forces using a functional
organizational C2 construct. However, several CTs provided a nuanced, sophisticated
C2 response inputs, with subdivided functional units (task groups) into geographic
functional subdivisions (task elements) within a broader functional task group. Finally,
one CT organized the MNF along national C2 structuctures.
2. Operational Design (concept of operations). Greatly summarizing, most (10)
CTs developed a phased plan. However, some (2) CT players noted that due to the
extremely limited, 90-day, time-horizon of the MNF authorization, traditional phasing
constructs in existing planning publications may not result in MNF mission
accomplishement within the prescribed (90 days) time frame. Therefore, simultaneous
implementation of several lines of operations may be required, such as maritme and
land security, humanitarian, and communication support to Orangeland, possibly with
less than optimal efficiency and effectiveness, but needed during the restrictive time
horizon.
3. Rules of Engagement/Rules on the Employment of the Use of Force (ROE).
The third sub-facet of Move 1 sought to highlight implications of differences among CT
players for the employment of maritime forces, as desrcibed by the specific-CT player
force employment concept (CONOPS). Most CT players had previously taken nationspecific use of force requirements into account when developing the MNG organization
C2 structure and operational design. Therefore, rules on the use of force were less
relevant in Move 1.
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Move 2
In Move 2, players were presented with a scenario update intended to prompt a
reconsideration of the original plan devised in Move 1. Key aspects of the Move 2
scenario update were the presence of a Redland Surface Action Group, fighting among
TCOs in Orangeland, the suspected seizure of an Orangeland submarine, and a denial
of service cyber attack against Orangeland government computer networks, hindering
the Orangeland government’s ability to communicate with its citizens.
Given the changes to the operational environment outlined in the Move 2 scenario
update, players were asked to:


consider changes, if any, to the command and control organizational structure
originally developed in Move 1, and



identify ROE changes, such as additional measures, required to perform the
MNF mission

1. Submarine. The unlocated Sango submarine with an uncertain crew composition
was the greatest concern of most CTs. CTs had a variety of concerns about the
uncertain control of the Sango submarine such as whether the submarine was:


forcibly seized by pirates or a TCO, or



forcibly seized by some elements of the crew disloyal to the Orangeland
government, but possibly with other loyal living crew members imprisoned
aboard

A major uncertainty was whether there were surviving loyal crew members held against
their will on the submarine.
A. C2, CONOPS Changes. Given the uncertainty of an unaccounted for
submarine with unclear intentions, most CTs modified their original concept of
operations and command and control organization and composition. Some CTs
reogranized forces with task groups explcitly organized for anti-submarine warfare, with
some CTs forming a “Task Group Sango”. Some CTs had aggressive plans to respond
to the unaccounted for submarine, while others had less aggressive plans.
B. ROE Changes. Most CTs identified a need for ROE changes, but with
greatly varying interpretations. There also was a great disparity between CTs on
whether or not to declare the submarine hostile and authorize engagement.
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2. Cyber. CT players were confronted with the challenege of how to respond to
cyber attacks against Orangeland governement computer networks greatly hampering
Orangeland’s ability to communicate with, and assure its citizens, in addition to the
unlocated submarine of unclear loylaty,
A. Not an MNF Task. Some CTs noted that cyber attacks against Orangeland
governmental ashore communications is beyond the MNF’s assigned reposnsibility.
B. MNF Orange Help With Alternative Communications. Other CTs
recognized that Orangeland’s inability to communicate and assure its citizens through
official governmental communications might increase unease among Orangeland
citizens. These CTs, therefore, suggested that the MNF may be a source to provide
alternative communication methods, with existing MNF maritime assets. For example,
MNF ships could be positioned closer to population centers to forward messages from
the Orangeland government. There was also the concern with Orangeland being able
to effectively manage its own C2, which was a driving cause for wanting to provide
SATCOM capabilities.
C. Form Cyber Task Group. One CT suggested forming a task group explicitly
focused on addressing cyber threats to Orangeland, as well as potential threats to the
MNF task force. This “TG Cyber” would not only assist MNF members defending MNF
assets from cyber threats, but also assist Orangeland protect itself from subsequent
cyber attacks.
3. Humanitarian Assitance. In Move 2, CTs were presented with an emerging
humanitarian crisis in Orangeland. Given the changing circumstances ashore, some
CTs reformed with “Task Group Humanitarian Assistance” to help Orangeland and
NGOs form and mangage internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, and to assist
managing the cholera problem.
Discussion Phase
Following each of the Moves, the Control Group reviewed player responses to
discern possible discussion topics by looking for commonalities or unique CT
responses. Once selected by the Control Group, discussion topics were posted for CT
players’ comment.
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Move 1 discussion topics:
1. How do national ROE and platform capabilities influence Task Force/Group
organization?
2. With the current OOB, mission duration and your Task Force organization, what
are the risks to mission and/or forces?
3. How do you plan to coordinate with and synchronize Orangeland forces into your
CONOPS and follow-on stability operations?
Move 2 Discussion Topics:
1. How should the CJTF plan to address the submarine threat while accounting for
potential Orangeland Naval Forces being held hostage on the Sango (for example,
search/track only, engage, sink, recapture, etc.)?
2. Due to national sensitivities with respect to cyber operations, what
limitations/constraints must the MNF Commander consider (C2 considerations, unit
assignment, cyber task force and components)?
3. How should the MNF handle detainees? Issues to consider: nationality of
detainees, detainee status (prisoner of war, enemy combatant, criminal), where to
detain and prosecute captured individuals, etc.
Based upon a review of responses to these discussion topics, the following themes
emerged from player responses.
Submarine. The greatest volume of discussion and least consensus on how to
respond invloved the missing Orangelnd submarine. Most CTs reorganized task groups
(TGs), modified the Move 1 MNF CONOPS, and identified ROE changes. A concern for
many countries on how to respond was the presence of crew members aboard,
presumed alive, but taken hostage.
One CT suggested that since the submarine belongs to Orangeland, the MNF
should first consult with Orangeland on how to proceed. Other CTs suggested finding
and tracking the submarine, but did not specify what actions if any would be taken after
finding the submarine. However, two other CTs suggested that they would attempt to
neutralize the submarine. Two CTs reorganized the MNF forces and created a TG
Sango, specifically dedicated to deal with the unlocated submarine. Another CT sought
an ROE change to permit a forced surfacing of the Sango.
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Cyber. Cyber was another topic that generated significant discussion. CTs shared
a variety of views on how to respond to the Orangelend distributed denial of service
(DDOS) cyber attack against its government computer network. This attack hindered
Orangeland’s ability to communicate and reassure its citizens that the governement is
effectively manageing the situation.
One CT noted the challenege of characterizing cyber in an order of battle (OOB).
Does an MNF describe its cyber ability as capability (does the MNF have the means
perform a cyber task) or cyber capacity (“how much cyber” does the MNF have)? A
related complication of characterizing cyber in an MNF OOB is how to reflect, account
for cyber capability that may be provided via reach-back from one or more MNFmember countries, sourced from outside the MNF.
Another CT noted that the real issue confronting the MNF is whether a cyber
capability exists within the MNF, versus the nationality of a country providing a cyber
capability. Two CTs noted that MNF cyber tasks should be focused on the defense of
MNF cyber systems, and not in support of Orangeland networks.
Other CTs assessed the cyber attack as a communication problem, and sought to
provide alternate communications methods for the Orangelend government to
reeestablish communications, such as through providing access to MNF satellite
comunication capability. Ensuring Orangeland’s ability to communicate with its citizens
would also contribute to Orangeland legitimacy in the eys of its citizens.
Humanitarian Assitance. Several CTs reorganized the MNF structure to include TG
Humanitarian Asisstance, if one had not been previously identified in Move 1. Two CTs
suggested establishment of an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp, and to assist
responding to the cholera outbreak. Another CT identified a need for a coordinated
effort to assist Orangeland and suggested creation of a Civil Military Operations Center
to coordinate Orangeland, non governmental organizations (NGOs), and MNF actions in
support of Orangeland.
Rules of Engagement (ROE). Most CTs suggested ROE changes, including
permission to conduct psychological operations (PSYOPS), a request for cyber ROE.
Three CTs suggested that countries consider delegating ROE decision to the MNF
commander to manage.
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Phasing of the Operation. Interestingly, two CTs noted that due to the limited, 90
day duration of the MNF, executing MNF operations sequentially by phase may result in
the MNF not completing its mission within the 90 day window. Therefore, multiple lines
of operations were initiated simultaneously (e.g., MIO, sub location, HADR) to increase
the likelihood that the MNF mission would be competed in the allotted time.
Detainees. The discussion on how to handle detainees from both Redland and
TCOs generated much discussion. One CT suggested that any forces detained from
Redland be treated as survivors at sea with the goal of immediate repatriation in order
to avoid further escalation with Redland involvement. Many CTs agreed with this
recommendation while a few others recommended Redland detainees be treated as
POWs. Most CTs agreed that any TCO detainees should be transferred to Orangeland
for criminal prosecution.
Conclusion
The 2013 IAWG provided an encellent opportunity for CT to exchange views among
maritime professionals. The USNWC would like to thank Captain Garcia, leader of the
Control Group delegation from Colombia, Captain Delgado, leader of the Control Group
delegation, from Brazil, and Captain Alvayay, from Chile, Assitant Game Director for
their superb contributions to the success of the 2013 IAWG.
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Appendix A
History of the Inter-American War Game
The following four paragraphs, reproduced verbatim, describe the history of the InterAmerican War Game as recorded on the web site of the Chilean Naval War College,
hosts of the 2008 Inter-American War Game. The USNWC thanks the Chilean NWC for
being a repository of the IAWG game history.
“The Inter-American War Game (IAWG) is an annual, one-sided seminar type
of game that was begun as a result of a decision taken during the Conference of
the Naval War Colleges of the Americas (CNWCA). The first meeting of the
CNWCA was held at the Naval War College, Newport, U.S.A. in 1962. The group
meets every second year following the Inter-American Naval Conference, a
CNO-level meeting.
The first IAWG was held in 1972 at the US Naval War College in Newport.
Since then it has been played uninterrupted with only two exceptions in 2001
and 2004. The IAWG host nation rotates annually among the naval war colleges
who are members of CNWCA.
The Inter-American War Game has evolved over time. At the beginning its
intention was to solve military problems with emphasis on the tactical level using
gaming and simulations. Since 1998 the IAWG has evolved to a seminar type of
game. It is now conducted as a War Game with educational objectives at the
operational level.
The IAWG has had other changes. In 1999, the CNWCA directed that the
IAWG be changed from 10 to 5 days. As a result of a briefing given by the
Argentine NWC at CNWCA in October, 2004, the NWC Directors agreed that
from 2005 and onward, the IAWG would be divided into two stages. The first
stage is conducted in a virtual environment via the internet. Prior to beginning
each IAWG, a fictional scenario is developed along with specific planning for the
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conduct of the IAWG. Upon execution, the game is played via internet in a series
of “moves” over a time period of about two weeks. A concluding “hot wash up”
and closure conference of two or three days duration is then held at a
designated naval war college where the IAWG participants discuss final
conclusions and recommendations” (Chilean Naval War College, 2013).
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Appendix B
Assistant Game Director
Our colleagues from the Chilean Naval War College generously volunteered at the
2012 IAWG Closing Conference to serve as the first Game Director Assistant and will
provide and update to participants at the IAWG 2013 closing conference. Specific
Game Director Assistant duties include:
a. Support the IAWG’s Game Director during the closing conference by listing the
agreements, disagreements, pending actions, accomplishment dates and all other
information that contribute to ensure a good control of the treated matters and the
signing process of the final document by each senior officer.
b. Keeps the historical records of the following documents:
i. Agreements and Disagreements.
ii. Game Book of each year with its corresponding objectives.
iii. Results of the assessment of progress in achieving the objectives.
c. Ensure that the above documents are received by all representatives of each
delegation to the closing conference of each year.
d. At the beginning of each year, deliver the historical record of documents indicated
in section b) to the new IAWG Game Director and support him in the implementation of
the previous year agreements.
e. Keep the updated list of IAWG’s points of contact (POC) of each navy with the
corresponding e-mail address and telephone number, and present it to the new IAWG
Game Director each year.
f. At the end of the Assistant’s period of three years, deliver a report to the
participants in the IAWG considering the following:
i. A summary of the annual agreements and the way they were implemented or
the reasons why some were not.
ii. Summary of the results of the assessment of progress in achieving the
objectives.

